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Transnational State-Sponsored Cyber Economic Espionage: A Legal Quagmire

Abstract

Transnational state-sponsored cyber economic espionage poses a threat to the economy of
developed countries whose industry is largely reliant on the value of information. In the face of
rapid technological development facilitating cyber economic espionage from afar on a massive
scale, the law has not developed apace to effectively address this problem. Applicable United
States domestic laws have been ineffective in addressing the problem due to lack of enforcement
jurisdiction, sovereign immunity, and inability to hold the state sponsor accountable. Customary
international law principles offer little help in combatting the issue, as countermeasures are
typically unavailable since espionage may not be ongoing by the time a victimized state can
confidently attribute it to a state and retortions are a relatively weak response. Although existing
treaties have not been effective in addressing this problem, a multilateral global treaty
specifically addressing transnational state-sponsored cyber economic espionage may be a
promising way forward.

Keywords: espionage; cybercrime; transnational crime; international law; state crime
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Transnational State-Sponsored Cyber Economic Espionage: A Legal Quagmire
Espionage for national security purposes has long been widely practiced and tacitly
tolerated, with countries largely escaping any accountability for their espionage activities under
international law – although individual spies can be prosecuted under domestic laws if subject to
the jurisdiction of that country’s judicial system (Blinderman and Din, 2017; Lotrionte, 2015;
Pun, 2017). Likewise, spying to gain economic advantage is certainly nothing new, despite
various domestic laws which can be brought to bear to punish such conduct (Lotrionte, 2015;
Reid, 2016). However, in recent years, technology has enabled economic espionage to be
conducted on a massive scale, from afar without the need to physically cross national borders,
relatively inexpensively, and often in relative anonymity (Crootof, 2018; Rowe, 2016). State
sponsorship of cyber economic espionage has raised the stakes due to the organization and
resources this provides to hackers, as well as the impact on national economies when wealth is
systematically transferred from one country to another through theft of valuable information for
the benefit of competing companies (Carlin, 2016; Lotrionte, 2015).
Transnational state-sponsored cyber economic espionage is a growing threat to developed
economies which have robust industry largely reliant on the value of information – such as the
United States economy (Lotrionte, 2015; Reid, 2016; Rowe, 2016). Numerous high profile
hacking incidents by China, North Korea, and Russia perpetrated against companies based in the
United States have raised public consciousness of the vulnerability of companies, and the United
States economy more generally, to cyber espionage from abroad (Anderson, 2017; Banks,
2017b; Blinderman and Din, 2017; Carlin, 2016; Reid, 2016). Policymakers are grappling with
how to craft effective, lawful responses which deter such espionage while avoiding an escalation
into an all-out cyberwar (Blinderman and Din, 2017; Crootof, 2018). These efforts are
3
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constrained by the lack of an effective legal framework for dealing with these incidents
(Blinderman and Din, 2017).
Although the Unites States has several domestic laws applicable to cyber economic
espionage, using such laws to hold perpetrators accountable or achieve restitution is often not
possible when the perpetrators commit offenses from abroad and with state backing (Blinderman
and Din, 2017; Perloff-Giles, 2018; Rowe, 2016). International law fails to specifically address
transnational state-sponsored cyber economic espionage (Crootof, 2018; Walton, 2017). Despite
efforts to reach consensus on how traditional international law principles apply to cyberspace, to
date, there is little clarity with regard to cyber operations which occur in peacetime and do not
constitute use of force (Crootof, 2018; Walton, 2017).
Unfortunately, the law has failed to keep pace with the breathtaking pace of technological
development and thus is largely inadequate to effectively address transnational state-sponsored
cyber economic espionage (Banks, 2017a; Rowe, 2016). Problematic issues include jurisdiction,
sovereign immunity, attribution, the failure of international law to clearly address peacetime
cyber espionage, and risks associated with available responses (Anderson, 2017; Blinderman and
Din, 2017; Perloff-Giles, 2018; Rowe, 2016; Walton, 2017). This article discusses the problem
of transnational state-sponsored cyber economic espionage, analyzes how the current United
States domestic legal framework applies to this phenomenon and what legal issues complicate
the effective use of these laws, examines the ineffectiveness of the current state of international
law in dealing with this problem, and discusses the implications of our failure to develop laws
better suited to addressing this vexing problem.
The Problem of Transnational State-Sponsored Cyber Economic Espionage
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Transnational state-sponsored cyber economic espionage is the unauthorized cross-border
collection of information by foreign governments or state-sponsored actors via cyber means for
the purpose of gaining an economic benefit (Lotrionte, 2015; Reid, 2016).1 In recent years,
cyber economic espionage has become a pressing concern, with technological developments
enabling espionage to be conducted remotely on a massive scale and with relatively low barriers
to entry in terms of both cost and technical expertise, resulting in estimated losses to the United
States economy in the billions of dollars per year (Anderson, 2017; Banks, 2017b; Carlin, 2016;
Crootof, 2018; Reid, 2016; Rowe, 2016). While cyber economic espionage committed by
insiders or organized crime groups without state sponsorship is also a significant issue (Inserra,
2017; Levandoski, 2018), this article will focus on transnational state-sponsored cyber economic
espionage due to the unique concerns raised by this type of espionage.
When cyber economic espionage is state sponsored and targets other nations’ private
companies for the purpose of stealing intellectual property and trade secrets to benefit competitor
companies, this poses a unique threat for several reasons (Lotrionte, 2015). First, state backing
provides a level of organization and funding to hackers which a typical individual hacker is
unlikely to possess (Argento, 2013). This creates a dynamic where individual private companies
are trying to defend against cyber intrusions by a nation (Rowe, 2016). Second, when conducted
systematically or on a large scale, it can erode a country’s economy by removing the competitive
edge of its private companies, undermining the return on those companies’ investments in
research and development (which disincentivizes such investments in the future), and
transferring large amounts of wealth (in the form of valuable information) to foreign competitor
companies who have not made such investments, thereby allowing the sponsoring state to take a
shortcut to grow its economy through cheating and outright theft (Carlin, 2016; Lotrionte, 2015).
5
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Third, the transnational nature of this espionage and the involvement of a state in perpetrating the
offense make crafting an effective response within the existing legal framework extremely
challenging (Blinderman and Din, 2017; Rowe, 2016). Thus, transnational state-sponsored cyber
economic espionage is a uniquely intractable problem warranting a closer examination of the
shortcomings of the current legal framework and the implications of our failure to develop laws
capable of effectively combatting this threat.
Overview of Relevant United States Domestic Laws
The current state of domestic law within the United States is inadequate to address
transnational state-sponsored cyber economic espionage (Blinderman and Din, 2017; Rowe,
2016). In the United States, there are domestic laws at both the federal and state levels which
can be used to address cyber economic espionage (Blinderman and Din, 2017; Rowe, 2016). At
the state level, there are state trade secret theft statutes (providing a state civil private right of
action for trade secret misappropriation; Beauchamp, 2017). Relevant federal statutes include
the Economic Espionage Act (providing criminal penalties for trade secret misappropriation), the
Defend Trade Secrets Act (providing a federal civil private right of action for trade secret
misappropriation), and the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (providing criminal sanctions and a
federal civil private right of action for unauthorized access of a computer; Blinderman and Din,
2017; Levandoski, 2018; Rowe, 2016). Despite the existence of a number of applicable
domestic laws, such laws fail to provide effective recourse in light of issues of jurisdiction, state
sovereignty, and attribution (Anderson, 2017; Blinderman and Din, 2017; Perloff-Giles, 2018).
United States Domestic Laws Protecting Trade Secrets
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The first category of United States domestic laws specifically protects trade secrets.
Nearly all states have state trade secret theft statutes patterned after the Uniform Trade Secrets
Act, which allow victimized companies to bring civil litigation against parties who
misappropriate their trade secrets (Beauchamp, 2017). However, reliance on a state law regime
can be problematic for companies operating in multiple states since such laws, despite the
“uniform” label, are not in fact uniform due to amendment of state laws over time and variation
in state court interpretation of these laws (Beauchamp, 2017).
At the federal level, the Economic Espionage Act provides criminal penalties for
domestic trade secret theft (18 U.S.C. § 1832) and trade secret theft for the benefit of foreign
governments (18 U.S.C. § 1831; Banks, 2017a; Danielson, 2009; Levandoski, 2018; Rowe,
2016). Although concern regarding foreign economic espionage was the primary motivator for
passage of the Economic Espionage Act, federal prosecutors have brought far more prosecutions
for domestic trade secret theft (§ 1832 violations) than for foreign economic espionage (§ 1831
violations; Levandoski, 2018). Overall, the Economic Espionage Act has failed to live up to its
promise, as there have been few prosecutions, even fewer convictions, and sentences have been
relatively light (Levine and Seaman, 2018; Reid, 2016).
One complicating factor which prevents the Economic Espionage Act from being
effective in combatting the problem of transnational state-sponsored cyber economic espionage
is a lack of enforcement jurisdiction with regard to defendants who are not physically present
within United States territory and have no assets within that territory (Perloff-Giles, 2018). In
such cases, unless the United States can secure the cooperation of the country where the
defendant is currently located in extraditing the defendant to the United States to face the charges
in court, the United States will be powerless to enforce any judgment – thus, sentences will not
7
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be served and fines will not be collected (Perloff-Giles, 2018). In the case of state-sponsored
transnational cyber economic espionage, such espionage can easily be conducted from abroad
and, for obvious reasons, it is unlikely the country sponsoring the espionage is going to
cooperate (Blinderman and Din, 2017; Danielson, 2009; Kosseff, 2019; Rowe, 2016).
Furthermore, the United States does not have extradition treaties with many of the countries who
are known to be prime offenders of state-sponsored transnational cyber economic espionage,
such as China, Russia, and North Korea – all of whom have sponsored recent high profile cyber
economic espionage against companies in the United States (Carlin, 2016; Levandoski, 2018;
Perloff-Giles, 2018).
Even if there is an extradition treaty and the country where the defendant is currently
located is willing to cooperate, there may be other obstacles to extradition – such as extradition
treaties’ dual criminality requirement (Brenner and Koops, 2004; Perloff-Giles, 2018). If the
alleged conduct is not a crime in the country where the defendant is located, the defendant will
not be extradited to the prosecuting country (Perloff-Giles, 2018). This is of particular concern
with regard to cyber activities inflicting transboundary harms, as it is not uncommon for
countries’ laws to fail to keep pace with technological developments facilitating relatively newer
harmful acts (Marion, 2010; Perloff-Giles, 2018). Moreover, due to political, economic, and
cultural differences between countries, not all countries share the United States’ view that
intellectual property is a protected property right (Danielson, 2009; Reid, 2016). Thus, some
countries may not criminalize trade secret misappropriation, in which case a defendant located in
that country will not be extradited to the United States to face charges under the Economic
Espionage Act, as the dual criminality requirement was not met (Perloff-Giles, 2018; Reid,
2016).
8
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Thus, even though the Economic Espionage Act provides for extraterritorial application,
extraterritorial enforcement can be challenging (Levandoski, 2018). For example, in 2014,
federal prosecutors initiated the first prosecution of state actors for hacking when a grand jury
indicted five Chinese military officers for violating the Economic Espionage Act in connection
with theft of trade secrets from power and metal industry companies in the United States (Carlin,
2016; Levandoski, 2018). However, because these Chinese military officers were not extradited
to the United States, they never faced criminal punishment for these charges and thus the
indictments were largely symbolic (Blinderman and Din, 2017; Carlin, 2016; Levandoski, 2018).
While it could be hoped that indictments in abstentia (without the defendant’s presence)
may serve as a general deterrent, by sending a message to all who hear about the indictments, the
impotence of such indictments may actually have the opposite impact – revealing the
powerlessness of the United States to hold state-sponsored hackers accountable for stealing trade
secrets from private companies in the United States (Lotrionte, 2015). Another problem with
this approach is that indicting individuals does nothing to hold the offending country itself
accountable for sponsoring cyber economic espionage because domestic criminal law holds
individuals, not countries, accountable (Crootof, 2018).
Recently, Congress enacted another federal statute to protect trade secrets (Beauchamp,
2017; Levandoski, 2018). The Defend Trade Secrets Act (18 U.S.C. § 1836) amends the
Economic Espionage Act to allow companies to bring private federal civil litigation against those
who misappropriate their trade secrets, provided the trade secrets are related to foreign or
interstate commerce (Beauchamp, 2017; Levandoski, 2018). This law is intended to make such
civil litigation easier for companies than it would be when suing under the state trade secret theft
statutes by providing uniformity, an obvious benefit to companies which operate in multiple
9
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states within the United States, and also provides for an ex parte seizure remedy (allowing the
court to seize property containing trade secret information pending completion of the litigation to
prevent irreparable damage) and fewer whistleblower protections than state trade secret theft
statutes do (Levine and Seaman, 2018).
Despite political rhetoric during the time leading up to the passage of the Defend Trade
Secrets Act regarding this legislation being needed to combat state-sponsored cyber economic
espionage, in practice the Defend Trade Secrets Act has primarily been used to address trade
secret misappropriation by insiders (e.g., former employees), not transnational hacking (Levine
and Seaman, 2018). The Defend Trade Secrets Act, at least in its infancy, has not borne much
fruit in fighting state-sponsored cyber economic espionage – with only 6% of federal court civil
lawsuits brought under this law in its first year alleging trade secret misappropriation by a
foreign defendant and only 9% alleging unauthorized access of a computer network (Levine and
Seaman, 2018). Thus, the early empirical evidence suggests there may be a need for further
legislative action more tailored to addressing cyber economic espionage in order to adequately
address this problem (Levine and Seaman, 2018).
The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act
In addition to laws specifically protecting trade secrets, there is another United States
domestic law at the federal level which can be used to address transnational state-sponsored
cyber economic espionage: the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (Blinderman and Din, 2017;
Rowe, 2016). The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act provides both criminal sanctions and a
private right to bring a federal civil suit for unauthorized access of a computer or intentionally
damaging an internet-connected computer via use of computer program or computer code
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(Argento, 2013; Banks, 2017a; Blinderman and Din, 2017). This law can thus be used to
prosecute hackers (Argento, 2013; Banks, 2017a).
The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act is plagued by a number of issues, including the
enforcement jurisdiction issue discussed above in connection with the Economic Espionage Act
(Blinderman and Din, 2017; Perloff-Giles, 2018). While the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act did
not originally explicitly confer extraterritorial (legislative) jurisdiction, subsequent amendments
changed the definition of a “protected computer” to clearly indicate this includes any computer
affecting interstate or foreign communication or commerce of the United States, regardless of
whether the computer is located within or outside of the United States, thus conferring on the
United States jurisdiction to prosecute offenses impacting such computers (Brenner and Koops,
2004). However, even though the United States may have extraterritorial jurisdiction to
prosecute such transnational offenses, this will often be impractical due to the country where the
offender is located refusing to extradite the offender (generally rendering the United States
unable to enforce any judgment obtained), such as when the conduct is not illegal in the country
of offender’s location (thus not satisfying the double criminality requirement of extradition
treaties) or when the United States does not have an extradition treaty with that country (Brenner
and Koops, 2004). Furthermore, due to the governmental involvement in the offense of
transnational state-sponsored cyber economic espionage, if the perpetrator is currently located
within the territory of the country which sponsored the act, it is exceedingly unlikely that country
will agree to extradite the offender (Blinderman and Din, 2017; Kosseff, 2019; Lotrionte, 2015;
Rowe, 2016). Furthermore, domestic criminal prosecution does nothing to hold the state sponsor
itself accountable and any attempt to bring civil litigation against the state sponsor would be
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stymied by sovereign immunity (Anderson, 2017; Blinderman and Din, 2017; Crootof, 2018;
Yannakogeorgos, 2013).
Legal Issues Complicating Use of United States Domestic Law
A number of legal issues complicate efforts to deter transnational state-sponsored cyber
economic espionage through the use of United States domestic law. First, jurisdictional issues
plague attempts to use domestic law to deter transnational cyber offenses, and this is exacerbated
by state sponsorship of such offenses (Perloff-Giles, 2018). Although jurisdictional issues were
briefly touched on in the discussion of specific statutes above, a more in depth discussion of
these issues is warranted here due to their complexity and importance. Three dimensions of
territorial jurisdiction can present issues when using domestic law to address transnational cyber
offenses -- legislative jurisdiction, judicial jurisdiction, and enforcement jurisdiction (PerloffGiles, 2018).
With regard to legislative jurisdiction, does the domestic statute have extraterritorial
application (Perloff-Giles, 2018)? In other words, does it apply to the cyber conduct simply
because it has effects in the United States, regardless of where the offender was when he
committed the offense (Perloff-Giles, 2018)? Where a statute does not explicitly provide for
extraterritorial application, courts are reluctant to find legislative intent for a law to apply
extraterritorially (Blinderman and Din, 2017; Perloff-Giles, 2018). And with good reason, as
extraterritorial application of domestic law to state-sponsored transnational cyber economic
espionage entails a risk that a prosecutor’s decision to prosecute foreign actors may trigger
retaliation by the other country, such as trade restrictions or ceasing cooperation in judicial
matters or military operations (Blinderman and Din, 2017).However, in the United States, there
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is a recent trend of broadening legislative and judicial jurisdiction to allow extraterritorial
application of certain statutes and grant courts authority to hear certain cases against foreign
defendants (Perloff-Giles, 2018). For example, the Economic Espionage Act explicitly provides
for extraterritorial application (Levandoski, 2018). Likewise, the Computer Fraud and Abuse
Act was amended to allow for extraterritorial application (Brenner and Koops, 2004).
Another jurisdictional issue is whether the court has jurisdiction to adjudicate the case
(Perloff-Giles, 2018). This requires that there be a sufficient connection between the offense and
the geographic area over which the court has jurisdiction (Perloff-Giles, 2018). This can often
be satisfied based on the harmful effects occurring in that geographic area – e.g., the computer
server that was hacked was located within the court’s jurisdiction (Rowe, 2016).
A highly problematic jurisdictional issue is whether the United States has jurisdiction to
enforce judgments (Perloff-Giles, 2018). If neither the defendant nor the defendant’s assets are
located within the United States’ territory, the defendant will never serve any sentence and no
fines will be collected unless the country where the defendant is currently located extradites the
defendant to the United States to face charges there (Perloff-Giles, 2018). In contrast to the
multinational corporations (with facilities and assets in numerous countries including the United
States) successfully prosecuted by the United States for transnational bribery using a domestic
extraterritorial enforcement approach (Hock, 2017), typical offenders may be individual hackers
located in other countries or government officials of other countries who have no ties to the
United States thus making transnational state-sponsored cyber economic espionage less
amenable to such an approach due to the enforcement jurisdiction obstacle.
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State sponsorship of transnational cyber economic espionage greatly exacerbates the
usual transnational crime enforcement jurisdiction issue because it is very unlikely that the
country which sponsored the espionage will cooperate by extraditing its hackers to the United
States to face charges under domestic law (Kosseff, 2019; Lotrionte, 2015). Even if the hacker is
currently located in a different country than the country which sponsored the espionage,
extradition may not be possible if the United States does not have an extradition treaty with that
country or if the conduct at issue is not criminalized in that country (due to extradition treaties’
dual criminality requirement), as may be the case when that country’s laws have failed to keep
up with technological advances facilitating new forms of harmful conduct or when a country
does not protect intellectual property in the way the United States does (Perloff-Giles, 2018;
Reid, 2016). And if digital evidence located in another country’s territory is needed to prove the
case, can the United States secure that country’s cooperation in obtaining that evidence in a
timely manner and with sufficient technical expertise (Perloff-Giles, 2018)? Mutual Legal
Assistance Treaties, by which countries agree to assist each other in criminal cases, may not be
of much help, as they only apply if the conduct is a crime in both of the countries involved and
may be processed so slowly that digital evidence has disappeared (Perloff-Giles, 2018).
Sovereign immunity is another legal issue complicating the use of domestic law to deter
transnational state-sponsored cyber economic espionage (Anderson, 2017; Blinderman and Din,
2017). Recourse against the perpetrators of transnational state-sponsored cyber economic
espionage through civil litigation is often elusive due to sovereign immunity (Anderson, 2017).
Creating an exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) allowing corporations to
sue foreign governments for damages caused by state-sponsored cyber intrusions is a possible
solution (Anderson, 2017; Blinderman and Din, 2017). Such an exception to sovereign
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immunity is not without precedent, as prior legislation has created an exception allowing civil
suits against state sponsors of terrorism, and may change would-be hackers’ cost-benefit
calculation and thus serve as a deterrent in addition to facilitating companies recouping their
economic losses (Blinderman and Din, 2017). However, passage of legislation creating a
sovereign immunity exception for state-sponsored cyber intrusions may prompt other countries
to enact similar laws, which could be used to address the United States’ cyber espionage
operations (Blinderman and Din, 2017).
Attribution is also a major obstacle to addressing transnational state-sponsored cyber
economic espionage via domestic law. Identifying which individual or group perpetrated the
acts constituting cyber economic espionage and where they are located is extremely challenging
due to perpetrators’ use of anonymizing tools, spoofing, public Wi-Fi networks, and botnets
spanning multiple countries (Finnemore and Hollis, 2016; Schmitt and Vihul, 2014; Tran, 2018;
Yannakogeorgos, 2013). Even if authorities are able to identify the computer from which the
cyber economic espionage operation originated, there remains the additional challenge of linking
that computer to the individuals who committed the act (Tran, 2018). This obstacle, however, is
equally applicable to use of international law -- and the difficulty is amplified in that context due
to the need to further link the individuals involved to the state sponsor (Blinderman and Din,
2017; Schmitt and Vihul, 2014; Tran, 2018), thus the difficulties of attribution will be discussed
in greater detail in a later section of this article.
Finally, the lack of sanctions on the state sponsor itself is another drawback to using an
approach of extraterritorial application of domestic law instead of an international solution
(Crootof, 2018; Yannakogeorgos, 2013). Thus, there is a need for an international approach that
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can specifically address transnational state-sponsored cyber economic espionage in a way that
facilitates holding accountable the state sponsoring it (Crootof, 2018; Yannakogeorgos, 2013).
Application of International Law to State-Sponsored Cyber Economic Espionage
The international legal community is grappling with how to apply international law,
developed using terms and classifications better suited to the physical domain, to cyberspace
(Crootof, 2018). At the invitation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCDCOE), an International Group of Experts
(IGE) wrote the Tallinn Manual on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare (Tallinn
Manual) and the Tallinn Manual 2.0 on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Operations
(Tallinn Manual 2.0), authoritative yet non-binding sources providing the experts’ views on how
established international law norms apply to cyber attacks constituting use of force (Tallinn
Manual) and cyber operations falling below the level of use of force (Tallinn Manual 2.0),
respectively (Banks, 2017b; Margulies, 2013). Due to the unsettled nature of international law in
the cyber realm, these restatement projects (intended to reflect the law as it currently exists)
necessarily provide general applicable principles and often leave ambiguity or indicate the
experts’ diverging views on applications of these principles to specific cyber scenarios (Banks,
2017b). Efforts to clarify international law norms on cyber operations falling below the use of
force threshold are impeded by a dearth of opinion jurio (state declarations that they are legally
obligated to engage in or abstain from certain conduct), a result of states’ hesitancy to
characterize cyber operations as international law violations, even when they are the victims, lest
they limit their own options going forward (Schmitt and Vihul, 2014).
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Despite political rhetoric characterizing transnational state-sponsored cyber economic
espionage as acts of cyberwar, the laws of war generally do not aid in combatting this problem
since it rarely rises to the level of use of force (Crootof, 2018; Walton, 2017). The United
Nations Charter restricts unilateral use of force to self-defense in case of armed attack (Crootof,
2018; Schmitt and Vihul, 2014). For a cyber action to constitute an armed attack, it must cause
death or serious injury or physical damage (Schmitt, 2013; Schmitt and Vihul, 2014). While
some scholars have attempted to stretch the meaning of terms in the laws of war (jus ad bellum,
governing when a state may use force, and jus in bello, international humanitarian law governing
the conduct of war) to cover lower level cyber intrusions, this is ill advised (Crootof, 2018;
Walton, 2017). Because cyber economic espionage does not typically inflict any physical
damage at all and certainly not physical damage equivalent to an armed attack, use of force in
response to cyber economic espionage would not comply with the laws of war (Crootof, 2018;
Perloff-Giles, 2018). Rather, the damage inflicted by cyber economic espionage is economic and
thus the political rhetoric regarding cyberwar is misplaced (Crootof, 2018).
The customary international law principles of state sovereignty and non-intervention
likewise offer little respite (Walton, 2017). There is no general consensus on how state
sovereignty applies in cyberspace – or even whether sovereignty has the force of a rule of
conduct versus whether it is more of an underlying (unenforceable) principle (Walton, 2017).
The interconnected nature of cyberspace makes it difficult to determine the boundaries of a
state’s territory in this realm (Walton, 2017). Moreover, states have been reluctant to pursue
establishing an international legal framework addressing covert intrusions on state sovereignty or
imposing an outright prohibition on cross-border cyber intrusions, lest such a framework impede
states’ own espionage activities conducted for national security purposes or unduly interfere with
17
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routine telecommunications and commercial activities having extraterritorial effects (Walton,
2017). The non-intervention principle is rarely implicated since routine transnational statesponsored cyber economic espionage generally lacks the required element of coercion of another
state’s governmental functions (Walton, 2017).
International law is strangely silent as to how countries can respond to lower level cyber
intrusions which cause massive economic damages, but do not constitute acts of war (Crootof,
2018; Walton, 2017). In fact, what little international law does say only serves to restrict
targeted countries’ lawful options for engaging in self-help responses (Crootof, 2018). This
reflects a preference in international law for keeping the peace by avoiding retaliatory escalation
cycles even if that comes at the expense of tolerating minor infringements (Crootof, 2018).
The customary law of countermeasures permits temporary, proportional, nonviolent
countermeasures (responses that would violate international obligations, such as those created by
treaty, if not undertaken as a response to an internationally wrongful act) when necessary to
induce an international law violator to cease the violation and make reparation (Banks, 2017b;
Crootof, 2018; Schmitt and Vihul, 2014; Schmitt and Vihul, 2017; Walton, 2017). In the context
of transnational state-sponsored cyber economic espionage, hacking back may be a useful
countermeasure (Schmitt and Vihul, 2014). However, the law of countermeasures does not
allow countermeasures for the purpose of punishment (Banks, 2017b; Crootof, 2018; Schmitt
and Vihul, 2014; Schmitt and Vihul, 2017). Often, cyber economic espionage is discovered and
attributed to a country long after it occurred (Crootof, 2018). In such cases, the targeted state
cannot lawfully employ countermeasures because the wrongful act has already ceased and
punitive countermeasures are not permitted under international law (Crootof, 2018).
Furthermore, use of countermeasures is fraught with risk – if the targeted state misattributes the
18
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cyber economic espionage to the wrong party, then the countermeasure will actually constitute a
violation of the targeted state’s international obligations (Crootof, 2018).
Thus, countries’ self-help options under international law are limited to retortions, which
are lawful self-help measures constituting political retaliation such as expelling diplomats,
imposing financial sanctions, ending economic aid, etc. (Crootof, 2018; Schmitt and Vihul,
2014). Unfortunately, retortions do not appear to be an effective deterrent to state-sponsored
cyber economic espionage (Crootof, 2018). The lack of a clear international legal framework
well suited to dealing with cyber intrusions has led to minimalist state responses, which likely
only emboldens hackers (Crootof, 2018).
Affected states often have few effective responses available and may be reluctant to
exercise certain options due to fear of escalation (Crootof, 2018). States may also be reluctant to
label cyber intrusions as violating international law lest those words be used against them when
they engage in questionable cyber operations in the future (Crootof, 2018; Watts and Richard,
2018). The United States, for example, refrained from claiming North Korea’s Sony hack
violated international law even though it arguably violated state sovereignty – although how the
international law norm of territorial sovereignty applies in cyberspace is currently unsettled
(Crootof, 2018; Watts and Richard, 2018). Given the United States’ aggressive cyber operations
in pursuit of national security objectives, this restraint is perhaps unsurprising (Crootof, 2018;
Watts and Richard, 2018).
Part of the problem in the international law arena is a lack of clarity with regard to where
to draw the line between tolerable cyber espionage and unlawful cyber espionage under
international law (Banks, 2017a; Reid, 2016). Espionage conducted by governments for national

19

CYBER ECONOMIC ESPIONAGE: A LEGAL QUAGMIRE
security purposes is a long-standing, widespread practice – typically addressed through domestic
laws and diplomacy (Banks, 2017a; Lotrionte, 2015; Reid, 2016). However, when espionage
serves an economic purpose, the issue becomes murkier (Banks, 2017a; Reid, 2016). While
government espionage conducted for the purpose of giving a country an advantage in trade
negotiations is arguably acceptable, state-sponsored international espionage for the purpose of
gaining an economic advantage for companies is generally considered beyond the pale (Banks,
2017a; Reid, 2016).
The United States takes the position that espionage for national security purposes is
conducted by all countries and thus tolerated, but that conducting espionage for the purpose of
stealing intellectual property and sharing that with private companies is unacceptable, criminal
conduct (Lotrionte, 2015; Reid, 2016). However, critics have pushed back on this position,
arguing that the United States also spies on economic institutions (Reid, 2016). The United
States does not accept this criticism, arguing that it only collects economic information for the
purpose of informing trade negotiations, but does not share this information with private
companies (Lotrionte, 2015; Reid, 2016). Countries’ differing political, social, and economic
structures, as well as their strategic interests given differing statuses with regard to level of
economic and technological development, contribute to differences in how they view intellectual
property and the propriety of government espionage for the purpose of giving corporations a
competitive advantage (Danielson, 2009; Reid, 2016).
There is a pressing need to develop clear international law prohibiting such cyber
economic espionage and providing an effective enforcement framework (Banks, 2017a).
Possible ways to draw the line distinguishing between tolerable cyber espionage and unlawful
cyber espionage under international law include prohibiting espionage for any purpose other than
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national security (although it may not always be easy to make this distinction) or prohibiting
government espionage for the purpose of providing economic benefit to private companies
(Banks, 2017a) – although such a distinction can quickly become a grey area since some
governments either own or exercise a high level of control over companies located within their
borders (e.g., North Korea, China; Wu, 2016). The U.S.-China bilateral security agreement,
which prohibits state-sponsored cyber economic espionage among the signatory countries for
commercial advantage, is an example of the latter approach, but is ineffectual due to its lack of
an enforcement mechanism, the difficulty of establishing the identity of cyber attack
perpetrators, and its limited scope which fails to offer protection against the most common types
of attacks such as intellectual property theft (Anderson, 2017).
The Budapest Convention
Treaties hold promise as a potential solution for addressing transnational state-sponsored
cyber economic espionage, yet have fallen short to date (Al Azzam, 2019; Marion, 2010). The
Council of Europe’s 2001 Convention on Cybercrime (Budapest Convention) is the most
significant multilateral treaty governing cybercrime (Al Azzam, 2019; Broadhurst and Chang,
2013; Cerezo et al, 2007; Eichensehr, 2017a). The Budapest Convention calls for parties to
enact domestic legislation criminalizing certain conduct constituting cybercrimes – including
illegally accessing computer systems (hacking), illegally intercepting computer data, interfering
with stored data, interfering with computer systems, and misusing devices (Bande, 2018;
Broadhurst and Chang, 2013; Cerezo et al, 2007). It also calls for parties to establish procedures
to facilitate domestic investigation and prosecution of those offenses (subject to parties’ existing
domestic laws protecting individual rights) and seeks to establish a framework for cooperation
among parties to better facilitate prosecution of cybercrimes (Al Azzam, 2019; Bande, 2018;
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Broadhurst and Chang, 2013; Cerezo et al, 2007; Clough, 2014). International cooperation
among parties takes the form of mutual assistance, extradition, and established points of contact
available around the clock (Broadhurst and Chang, 2013; Cerezo et al, 2007; Clough, 2014).
The Budapest Convention’s effectiveness in dealing with transnational state-sponsored
cyber economic espionage is lacking for several reasons. First and foremost, by taking a
domestic law enforcement approach, it does not provide a method for sanctioning the state
sponsor – at most, the individuals involved may be prosecuted (Crootof, 2018; Yannakogeorgos,
2013).
Second, if the individuals involved are located within the territory of the state which
sponsored the cyber economic espionage, it is exceedingly unlikely that state will cooperate with
extradition and thus the victimized state will not have enforcement jurisdiction over those
individuals (Blinderman and Din, 2017; Kosseff, 2019; Lotrionte, 2015; Rowe, 2016). Parties to
the Budapest Convention are not obligated to extradite unless there is an existing extradition
treaty with the requesting party and both parties’ laws provide a maximum punishment of at least
one year imprisonment for the offense (Cerezo et al, 2007; Clough, 2014). The United States
does not have extradition treaties with many of the states known to be prime offenders (Carlin,
2016; Levandoski, 2018; Perloff-Giles, 2018). While the Budapest Convention sought to
overcome the obstacle to extradition presented by the dual criminality requirement in calling for
harmonization of domestic criminal laws related to cybercrime, in practice parties’ establishment
of domestic criminal laws adequately governing cybercrimes has been inconsistent and there is
no effective enforcement mechanism to force parties to expeditiously pass domestic laws
adequately addressing the problem (Ajayi, 2016; Al Azzam, 2019; Marion, 2010). Thus, even if
there is a relevant extradition treaty, the party in whose territory the individual offenders are
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located may not have a law criminalizing the conduct or its laws may not punish that conduct
with a maximum punishment of at least one year in prison (Ajayi, 2016; Al Azzam, 2019;
Cerezo et al, 2007; Clough, 2014; Marion, 2010). Even if the dual criminality requirement is not
an issue, the decision whether to extradite is up to the party of which extradition is requested and
may be refused on various grounds, such as when extradition is requested for prosecuting what is
viewed as a political offense or when the person may be subjected to inhumane punishments
(Clough, 2014). Thus, there are loopholes which could be exploited by a party which does not
want to cooperate with extradition.
Finally, the Budapest Convention is inapplicable to nations which are not parties to the
treaty – including China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran, states known as primary threats due to
their history of perpetrating state-sponsored cyber economic espionage (Bande, 2018; Broadhurst
and Chang, 2013; Carlin, 2016; Inserra, 2017; Kosseff, 2019; Levandoski, 2018; Lotrionte, 2015;
Perloff-Giles, 2018; Reid, 2016; Rowe, 2016). The vast majority of parties to the Budapest
Convention are European and Western and many countries have refused to join the Budapest
Convention due to concerns regarding their lack of input into its development, concerns that its
transborder data access provision violates state sovereignty, and privacy concerns (Bande, 2018;
Cerezo et al, 2007; Clough, 2014; Eichensehr, 2017a; Inserra, 2017).
The Challenge of Attribution
Attribution issues are a major obstacle which often hinder efforts to use either domestic
or international law to combat transnational state-sponsored cyber economic espionage
(Blinderman and Din, 2017). The challenge of attributing transnational state-sponsored cyber
economic espionage is two-fold (Schmitt and Vihul, 2014; Tran, 2018). First, there is the often
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difficult task of technical attribution, identifying which individual or group perpetrated the acts
constituting cyber economic espionage and where that perpetrator is located (Schmitt and Vihul,
2014; Tran, 2018; Yannakogeorgos, 2013). Once this is accomplished, another challenge awaits
– attributing the espionage to a state (Schmitt and Vihul, 2014; Tran, 2018).
Technical attribution can be difficult due to the anonymity afforded by the internet
(Yannakogeorgos, 2013). Due to vulnerabilities in the standardized internet protocol used for
transmitting information among computers, perpetrators can easily hide their location by using
anonymizing tools, such as the use of proxy servers or onion routing (Tran, 2018;
Yannakogeorgos, 2013). Sophisticated perpetrators can implicate innocent computer users as the
originators of the hacking incident by spoofing internet protocol (IP) addresses (Finnemore and
Hollis, 2016; Yannakogeorgos, 2013). This not only complicates technical attribution, but also
may undermine confidence in attribution when those accused predictably claim they have been
set up by the true perpetrators (Finnemore and Hollis, 2016). Furthermore, identifying the
computer from which a cyber economic espionage operation originated is only one hurdle, as it
is also necessary to determine the individuals who committed the act and this is not always a
straightforward determination, given that perpetrators may use public Wi-Fi networks or covertly
control others’ devices to employ them in their schemes (Tran, 2018).
Technical attribution may also be challenging due to perpetrators’ use of elaborate means
to commit cyber economic espionage – such as botnets, networks of remotely controlled
computers that may be located in multiple countries, some of which may have been selected by
the perpetrator specifically for their qualities which maximize the difficulty of attribution such as
lack of technical capacity necessary for effective investigations or being on unfriendly terms
with the country in which the victimized corporation is located (Yannakogeorgos, 2013). Even
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when cyber economic espionage is accomplished by simpler means, in this era of cloud
computing -- where data may be located in multiple countries and it can even be difficult to
determine the location of the necessary data -- collecting the data needed to ascertain the identity
of the perpetrator may involve making requests for assistance from multiple countries pursuant
to mutual legal assistance treaties (MLATs), which can be problematic as the slow pace at which
such assistance requests are processed tends to be ill suited to obtaining digital evidence before it
disappears (Eichensehr, 2017a).
Even if the individual or group who perpetrated the acts constituting transnational cyber
economic espionage is identified, attributing the espionage to a state can be extremely
challenging (Schmitt and Vihul, 2014). State sponsors may use independent hackers acting on
the state’s behalf, which allows these foreign governments to deny responsibility with some
degree of believability (Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive, 2011;
Yannakogeorgos, 2013). State involvement may be suspected when the cyber economic
espionage aligns with a state’s interests, but presuming state involvement is hazardous given the
relatively low cost and technical expertise barriers to conducting cyber espionage, as it is not
unfeasible for cyber espionage to be conducted by non-governmental individuals or groups
(Schmitt and Vihul, 2014). Is the non-state actor simply a patriot acting on its own accord in a
manner that aligns with the state’s interests, a non-state actor pursuing its own interests in a
manner which happens to also support the state’s interests, or a non-state actor committing cyber
economic espionage at the state’s urging or with state support (Schmitt and Vihul, 2014)?
Under customary international law’s state responsibility doctrine, transnational cyber
economic espionage can be attributed to a state when conducted by: (1) an organ of the state
(exercising governmental functions) -- such as an intelligence agency – regardless of whether the
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espionage was authorized; or (2) a non-state actor (e.g., private individuals, groups, corporations,
etc.) acting upon the state’s instructions or under its direction or control with regard to the cyber
economic espionage operation (Banks, 2017b; Schmitt and Vihul, 2014; Schmitt and Vihul,
2017; Tran, 2018). Transnational cyber economic espionage will not be attributed to a state
merely because it provided funding to the non-state actor that committed the espionage, nor is
mere encouragement by the state enough for such attribution (Banks, 2017b; Margulies, 2013;
Schmitt, 2013; Schmitt and Vihul, 2014). When technical attribution identifies a group of
private individual hackers as the culprit, it can be difficult to prove with reasonable certainty that
the state had the requisite level of control over their actions which constituted cyber economic
espionage (Schmitt and Vihul, 2014; Tran, 2018).
There is also an additional hurdle – a state can only be held responsible, thus warranting
countermeasures, if the action attributed to the state actually violates an international legal
obligation, which are generally established by either treaties or customary international law
(Banks, 2017b; Schmitt and Vihul, 2014). In the absence of a treaty prohibiting transnational
cyber economic espionage (e.g., the U.S.-China Bilateral Security Agreement), it is debatable
whether such activity violates an international legal obligation – arguably, it could be construed
as a violation of state sovereignty, but this is far from settled international law (Anderson, 2017;
Walton, 2017). Note that a state cannot he held responsible under customary international law
for violation of a domestic law (Banks, 2017b).
Even if the cyber economic espionage violates an international legal obligation, it is
likely that attribution to a state will occur too late for countermeasures to be an option, as states
may hesitate to make such an accusation until they arrive at a high level of confidence in their
assessment – an often lengthy process since it relies on considering a combination of digital
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forensics, signals intelligence, human intelligence, and circumstantial evidence based on context
(Banks, 2017b). If the violation is no longer ongoing (and thus any countermeasures employed
may be viewed as punitive), a state’s only available response may be retortions, which pale in
comparison to the seriousness of the losses caused by the cyber espionage (Banks, 2017b).
While state sponsorship of transnational cyber economic espionage may often be
suspected, the bar for establishing state responsibility is set high in light of the potential
consequences of misattribution -- or even correct attribution without convincing evidence -- and
restraint is typically the order of the day (Blinderman and Din, 2017). Any efforts to hold the
perpetrators to account, whether that be through criminal prosecution, civil litigation, diplomacy,
other governmental response, targets’ self-help measures, or other means, are fraught with risk of
international diplomatic ramifications, public relations disaster, retaliation, and escalation
(Blinderman and Din, 2017; Crootof, 2018). Attribution of cyber espionage to a country has
foreign policy impacts, as it may lead to suspension of important diplomatic negotiations,
tensions in diplomatic relations, and even retaliatory hacking (Blinderman and Din, 2017). Thus,
a targeted state may be reluctant to attribute transnational cyber economic espionage to a state in
light of the aforementioned risks and the fact that available legal responses often end up being
symbolic due to lack of jurisdiction or sovereign immunity and likely governmental responses,
owing to reticence to start an escalating cyber war, may be extremely weak in comparison to the
gravity of the offense (Blinderman and Din, 2017).
Conclusion
In recent years, transnational cyber economic espionage has become a growing threat due
to technological advances facilitating espionage from afar and the vulnerabilities associated with
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mass digital storage of information and the interconnectedness of people and companies across
borders in a globalized information economy (Argento, 2013; Crootof, 2018; Rowe, 2016).
Technological advancement combined with state sponsoring of economic espionage has raised
the stakes for finding a way to deter cyber economic espionage, prompting policymakers to pass
domestic legislation seeking to address this problem and the international law community to
grapple with formulating an understanding of how existing international law applies in the cyber
context (Blinderman and Din, 2017; Carlin, 2016; Crootof, 2018; Lotrionte, 2015; Walton,
2017).
The United States has several domestic laws applicable to cyber economic espionage
(Blinderman and Din, 2017; Rowe, 2016). However, when the perpetrators are foreign
governments or private actors located abroad and acting under the direction of those
governments, these laws are largely ineffective due to issues such as difficulty in attributing the
bad acts to the perpetrators with sufficient certainty, inability to extradite the perpetrators to the
United States to face prosecution and punishment, and sovereign immunity (Anderson, 2017;
Blinderman and Din, 2017; Perloff-Giles, 2018). The relatively few attempts to use domestic
laws to address transnational state-sponsored cyber economic espionage have had little more
than symbolic value, which only serves to reveal the shortcomings of such an approach
(Blinderman and Din, 2017; Carlin, 2016; Levandoski, 2018; Lotrionte, 2015).
International law does no better a job at addressing this pressing problem, offering little
clarity regarding the regulation of transnational state-sponsored cyber economic espionage
during peacetime (Walton, 2017). Despite rhetoric characterizing cyber attacks as acts of war,
countries have not in practice retaliated as they would to acts of war due to the difficulties
inherent in applying the law of armed conflict international legal framework, developed with
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reference to the physical realm, to actions occurring in the information realm (Beard, 2014).
Neither the laws of war nor the customary international law principles of state sovereignty and
non-intervention provide an effective legal framework for addressing transnational statesponsored cyber economic espionage (Walton, 2017). As it currently stands, international law
mainly functions only to limit a country’s self-help options and offers little help in formulating
effective responses to transnational state-sponsored cyber economic espionage (Crootof, 2018).
Because countermeasures cannot lawfully be employed for purposes of punishment, targeted
countries are often limited in their self-help response to retortions, a relatively weak response
which allows states to escape any meaningful accountability for sponsoring transnational cyber
economic espionage (Crootof, 2018).
A lack of clarity regarding how existing international law applies in the cyber context,
compounded by difficulties in reaching the consensus necessary to formulate new international
norms governing peacetime cyber espionage, leaves targeted countries with few effective options
for combatting transnational state-sponsored cyber economic espionage without risking an
escalating cyber war (Crootof, 2018; Reid, 2016). As it stands, we lack an adequate legal
framework for effectively responding to the threat of transnational state-sponsored cyber
economic espionage. Despite numerous legislative attempts to remedy this state of affairs,
domestic law in the United States falls short due to the challenges of combatting a harm
perpetrated from afar with the support of a foreign power using technology which readily
obscures responsibility for such conduct (Blinderman and Din, 2017; Perloff-Giles, 2018).
Given the massive scope of the problem, international law is astoundingly silent, by and large, on
how nations can address peacetime transnational state-sponsored cyber economic espionage
(Walton, 2017). Further complicating matters, nations with advanced cyber capabilities, such as
29

CYBER ECONOMIC ESPIONAGE: A LEGAL QUAGMIRE
the United States, have incentives to not push for clarification of international law as it applies to
cyberspace through norm building, lest they restrict their own options in dealing with national
security threats (Crootof, 2018; Watts and Richard, 2018).
Treaties hold promise for addressing the problem, but have fallen short to date (Al
Azzam, 2019; Marion, 2010). The Budapest Convention does not effectively address
transnational state-sponsored cyber economic espionage because: (1) it does not provide a way to
sanction the state sponsor itself since it takes a domestic law enforcement approach; (2) it relies
on existing extradition treaties and does nothing to close loopholes which may allow the
requested party to refuse extradition; and (3) its reach falls short of being truly global and does
not bind nonparties – including states with a serious track record of transnational state-sponsored
cyber economic espionage (Bande, 2018; Broadhurst and Chang, 2013; Carlin, 2016; Cerezo et
al, 2007; Clough, 2014; Crootof, 2018; Inserra, 2017). The U.S.-China Bilateral Security
Agreement attempts to directly address the problem of transnational state-sponsored cyber
economic espionage, but is ineffective due to its lack of an enforcement mechanism (Anderson,
2017).
While certainly not an easy task, the most promising way forward is to develop a
multilateral treaty under the auspices of the United Nations which specifically prohibits
transnational state-sponsored cyber economic espionage, with provisions for an international
tribunal to adjudicate attribution and impose sanctions on states which engage in transnational
state-sponsored cyber economic espionage (Clough, 2014; Perloff-Giles, 2018; Tran, 2018).
This solution provides the prospect of setting norms with a global reach – which is essential to
effectively addressing transnational state-sponsored cyber economic espionage (Finnemore and
Hollis, 2016). It also has the virtue of providing a mechanism for holding states accountable for
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state sponsorship of transnational state-sponsored cyber economic espionage through multilateral
action, thus avoiding the escalation risks posed by a victimized state’s use of a unilateral
response pursuant to customary international law in the absence of clarity regarding how
international law norms developed for the physical realm apply in the cyber realm (Blinderman
and Din, 2017; Crootof, 2018). Availability of sanctions may serve as a deterrent to stem the
tide of transnational state-sponsored cyber economic espionage once states realize they can no
longer engage in such conduct with impunity (Crootof, 2018; Inserra, 2017; Lotrionte, 2015). It
certainly has the potential for improved deterrence compared to reliance on symbolic indictments
under domestic law where the individuals involved receive no punishment due to lack of
enforcement jurisdiction (Crootof, 2018; Lotrionte, 2015). Unlike countermeasures under
customary international law, the availability of these sanctions would not be contingent on being
able to attribute transnational cyber economic espionage to a state with reasonable certainty
before the espionage has ceased – rather, the sanctions can provide an after-the-fact remedy that
is punitive and intended as a deterrent for future similar transgressions (Banks, 2017b). While
attribution will still be a challenging endeavor, such a treaty can at least provide a remedy in
those cases where there is sufficient evidence to attribute transnational state-sponsored cyber
economic espionage and can accommodate the reality that attribution may often come only after
a lengthy investigation (Banks, 2017b).
Developing treaty provisions specifically addressing transnational state-sponsored cyber
economic espionage will be extremely challenging, given countries’ differing views regarding
where to draw the line for what constitutes impermissible espionage (Banks, 2017a; Reid, 2016).
However, the U.S.-China bilateral security agreement, followed by the G-20 countries
subsequently embracing the norm against cyber espionage for commercial advantage, gives some
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hope that perhaps achieving consensus on an agreement narrowly addressing transnational statesponsored cyber economic espionage, as opposed to cybercrime more generally, may have a shot
at being successful (Finnemore and Hollis, 2016). Given the high economic stakes (Carlin,
2016; Reid, 2016) and potential for international conflict inherent in unilateral enforcement
(Blinderman and Din, 2017), we cannot afford to shy away from doing the difficult work
necessary to reach agreement on such treaty provisions.
Until such an agreement is reached, we are in a legal quagmire, with little in the way of
effective options for deterring a growing economic threat (Crootof, 2018). Until the legal system
develops a more effective legal framework for combatting transnational state-sponsored cyber
economic espionage, private companies are left to play continual defense against cyber
intrusions by well-organized, state-supported hackers (Crootof, 2018). However, the absence of
effective legal recourse poses the risk that companies may choose to pursue vigilante justice by
hacking back, which is fraught with perils in terms of foreign policy implications (Eichensehr,
2017b; Perloff-Giles, 2018). Hacking back poses a risk of harm to innocent parties due to
misattribution, excessively punitive responses, and potential violations of domestic or
international laws (Rowe, 2016). The time is long past for developing a multilateral global treaty
specifically addressing transnational state-sponsored cyber economic espionage and providing an
effective enforcement mechanism. Hopefully, it does not take a cataclysmic event to motivate
countries to look beyond their own parochial interests in order to come to a consensus on a legal
framework which can protect the long-term economic prosperity that comes with economic
security.
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Notes
1

Cyber means relating to information technology such as computers, computer networks,

and the internet (Nato Cooperative Cyber Defence Center of Excellence, n.d.).
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